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[50 0.2d

June 30, 1958.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILBERT FEJ_.Ix FRIEND,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-Under Const., art. VI, § 19, providing that the court
may make such "comment" on the evidence and the testimony
and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for
proper determination of the case, a trial judge is empowered
to do more than merely summarize the evidence; he may
analyze the testimony critically, giving his opinions for the
guidance of the jury.
[2] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-The
purpose of the 1934 amendment of Const., art. VI, § 19, is to
enable the trial judge to comment to the jury on the facts of
the case, to give the jurors his analysis of the evidence and to
express his opinion on the merits of the case, informing them
at the same time that his views are merely advisory.
[3] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-In
approving the 1934 amendment of Const., art. VI, § 19, the intent of the voters was to make the judge a real factor in the
administration of justice rather than a mere referee, and to
remove the prior prohibition against his power to comment.
[4] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-A
trial judge is not "rigorously prohibited" from action or words
having the effect of conveying to the jury his personal opinion
as to the truth or falsity of any evidence. (Disapproving statement to the contrary in People v. O'Donnell, 11 Cal.2d 666, 671
[81 P.2d 939].)
[5] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-A
judge's power to comment on the evidence is not unlimited;
he may not withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration or distort the testimony, and his comments should
be temperately and fairly made, rather than argumentative
or contentious to a degree amounting to partisan advocacy;
the jury must remain the exclusive arbiter of questions of fact
and credibility of witnesses, and the judge should make clear
that his views are not binding but advisory only.
[6a, 6b] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.
-A judge may restrict his comments to portions of the evidence or to the credibility of a single witness and need not
sum up all the testimony, both favorable and unfavorable.
[1] See Am.Jur., Trial, § 82.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Criminal Law, § 675.1(2); [5-7]
Criminal Law, ~ 675.1(4); [8-11] Criminal Law, § 675.1(7).
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(Disapproving any stat<:>ments to the contrary in People v.
Hoope1·, 92 Cal.App.2d .'524, 531 [207 P.2d 117]; 1'eople v.
Mason, 72 Cal.App.2d 6!J9, 711 [165 P.2d 481]; and People v.
TalkinJton, 8 Cal.App.2d 75, 99 [47 P.2d 368].)
[7] !d.-Province of Court and ,Tury-Comment on Evidence.There is no justification for holding that a judge has a lesser
right to comment on the evidence where punishment is involved
than where matters relating to guilt are in issue, and the same
principles should be applied in determining whether the power
has been properly exercised.
[8] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.-The
judge in commenting on the evidence in a murder case complied
with the requirement that his comments were not binding on
them where he pointed out that the jurors were free to reject
anything which did not coincide with their views, that they
were the '·judges of the evidence," that it was up to them to
decide what was to be done with defendant, and that "The
penalty is entirely up to you and let the evidence and your
conscience be your guide."
[9] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.The judge's comment on the evidence in a murder case that
defendant had on two occasions refused to answer questions
"relative to the rape and relative to the molesting of the
minor children several years later and the rape on the elderly
woman," and that defendant was ordered to answer by the
court and said, "I don't remember" or "I don't know," was inaccurate where the record disclosed that the first of these
questons pertained to the location of defendant's suitcases at
about the time of a telephone conversation with his probation
officer (to which defendant replied that he did not recall),
and that the second referred to whether defendant went to a
certain park on the night of the murder (to which he replied,
"I think I did"), but constituted no more than a minor inaccuracy which could not have prejudiced defendant.
[10] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.It was not error for the judge to make the comment in a murder
case that "It is up to you [the jury] to determine whether
[defendant] showed any remorse or whether he has told you
everything from the witness stand that he knew," where it
was preceded by the direction that the jury "may consider"
whether defendant had any remorse and was followed by the
remark that "you may take all those things into consideration."
[11] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Comment on Evidence.The judge's comments in a murder case were not limited to
evidence unfavorable to defendant where the judge pointed
out that defendant had made a confession, that he had undergone an orchidectomy, that the jury could consider his his-
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tory after the operation, and that it did not appear that he
had been in any serious trouble since then, and where no reference was made to the testimony of defendant's sister-in-law
that defendant, following a telt>phone conversation with his
probation officer, had said, "Well, murder will out," mentioned
the existence of a warrant, and stated that he thought he would
take his suitcases and "start traveling."

APPEAL (automatirally taken under Prn. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b)) from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County and from an order denying a new trial. John A.
Hewieker, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment imposing the death
penalty, after retrial to determine punishment, affirmed.
John R. Sorbo, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Rl"spondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-Defendant previously appealed from a
judgment whirh imposed the dt>ath penalty in accordance with
a jury verdict. We upheld his conviction of murder of the
first degree, but, because of errors relating to the issue of
punishment, we remanded the cause for the sole purpose of
redetermining that issue. (People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749,
772 [306 P.2d 463] .) On retrial, the jury fixed the penalty at
death, and the case is again before us automatically. (Pen.
Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) The only question presented is
whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial by the judge's
comments on the evidence.
One morning in 1936, Ruth Muir's body was found on the
beach in La Jolla about a block from the home of her parents.
Her face was covered with blood, and a bench leg which had
been used as a club lay nearby. An autopsy surgeon discovered numerous bruises, abrasions and lacerations on the body
and head and determint'd that death had been caused by fracture of the skull and multiple injuries. Defendant was living
in a tent on the beach, and, when the police questioned him,
he denied knowing anything about the killing and was released. 'l'he crime remained unsolved until 1955, when defendant, an ex-convict who was 44 years of age, confessed to having
committed it.
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In the five years following the killing, defendant was convicted of burglary, contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, 1 and rape. In connection with his conviction of rape,
defendant was placed on probation for 25 yrars on condition
that he serve six month:;; in jail and undergo an orchidectomy.
This operation was performed in 1941. Thereafter, until J 955,
defendant's record was clear '>l'ith the exception of a $20 fine
for stealing a relative's dog in 1946 and an arrest in 1952 for
causing a disturbance while drunk in a bar.
In 1955 defrndant went to Detroit for two months in violation of the terms of his probation. About a week after he
returned to California, his probation officer telephonrd him.
arranged to meet him in a few days, and told him that he had
violated his probation and that there was a warrant for his
arrest. According to defendant's sister-in-law, when he hung
up the telephone, he said, "\Veil, murdrr will out," mentioned
the existence of a warrant, and statrd that he thought that
he would take his suitcase>; and "start traveling." The following evening, after spending srveral hours in a bar, defendant telephonrd a newspaper reporter and said that he had
killed Miss Muir. The record does not disclose the other
circumstances leading to defendant's arrest.
Upon being taken into custody, defendant told the police
that he had committrd the crime but that he had not molested
the victim or taken any valuables from her. In subsrquent
interviews he stated that he had been drinl<ing and had lost
his money playing pool and that, about !J or 10 p. m., he went
to the beach looking for someone to rob because he wanted
money to buy more drinks. After removing a leg from a picnic
bench to use as a club, he saw a woman who was seated facing
the ocean, walked up behind her, and struck her a heavy blow
on the head, knocking her to the ground. He then dragged
her to a nearby gully, ·where he struc·k her sevrral times about
the faee with his fists. He cut the laces of her corset with a
knife and raped her, or tried to rape her. In explanation of
his delay of 19 years in confessing the crime, he said that he
wished to ayoid hurting his parents and his wife, who were
now dead.
Defendant did not take the witness stand at the first trial.
At the second trial he testified that he had not been troubled
by an exerssive srx urge after undergoing the orchidectomy.
"Defendant was charged with misconduct of a sexual nature with two
little girls and pleaded guilty to one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

574

PEOPLE

v.

FRIEND

[50 C.2d

He denied that, when he received the telephone call from his
probation officer, he made the statements which his sister-inlaw attributed to him or that he confessed b<'cause he thought
the arrest warrant mentioned by the officer related to the
killing. According to defendant, he decided to confess two
weeks earlier in Detroit. He testified, ''One reason I was tired,
that is why I turned myself in. Seemed like I was running
all these years, trying to get something settled in my mind.
That was one way, to come ont with the truth, because I had
read once or t-wice in the Bible where the truth would set you
free, and after I confessed to this last, this murder, this error
in my life, well, I was free in my mind, although not in my
body . . . . It seemed to me th<'re was only one way out and
that was to tell the truth about it. At least you can't go
wrong by telling the truth. I could see that. I can't see
where I have lost anything by telling the truth, although I did
sit up there close to the gas chamber for eighteen or ninetf'en
months. 'l'hat kind of opened my eyes up to what I had
done.''
Before giving formal instructions to the jury, the trial
judge made the following remarks: ''Under the law, ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, and under the Constitution, I am
entitled to comment on the evidence in this cast'. I am going to
make a few comments and tell you certain things you can
consider, and, of course, anything I say is not binding on
you; you can disregard it. I will just point out various things
and if it coincides with your views, accept it; if it doesn't, why
reject it.
"The argument of counsel in this case is not evidence.
Neither is anything I tell you evidence in this case. Of
course, both sides in this case put forward their best foot
to try to get you to see their side of the case. Now you have
heard all the evidence. You are the judges of the evidence
and it is up to you to decide what should be done with the
defendant in this case.
"Now, of course, this was a brutal murder. You heard
all the faets, the testimony here of the People, and the defendant took the witness stand. Now it is true that he called the
newspapers and said he had committed this crime. He did
say that the second time he called the newspapers he had no
recollection of his eall. How intoxicatrd he was the night he
called the newspaper I do not know.
"You saw the def('ndant on the witness stand on two differcut occasions when he wouldn't answer the questions on cross-
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examination. Now it has been stated here he made a confession. When certain questions were asked him why he
didn't want to answer them. When I ordered him to answer
them he said, 'I don't remember,' or 'I don't know.' Those
were questions relative to the rape and relative to the molesting of the minor children several years later and the rape on
the elderly woman on which he was on probation at the time
he was picked up for this offense.
"Now you can consider, of course, the various items of his
confession, his history throughout his life, both before and
after this event here, the fact that he had this operation. Now
it has been said he wasn't in auy trouble since the operation,
no serious trouble. Well, when we put people on probationhe was on 25 years probation-we expect them to comply with
the law and if they violate it in any serious degree probation
is revoked and the defendant is sentenced to the State Prison
or County Jail, depending upon the character of the offense.
Probation is a deterrent; at least I have always considered
it such. You put a man on probation and you figure he is
going to behave himself to a certain extent. Whether or not
his behavior was the result of being on probation or the result
of the operation, or a combination of both, is up to you to
determine.
"You saw the defendant on the stand. You may consider
whether he had any remorse for this crime. I heard his testimony. I seemed to feel as I heard it that Mr. Friend was
concerned mostly about his own plight and not what he had
done. He didn't want to go to Capistrano on the day he went
up there, according to his own statements. He made the
statement that the dead would take care of themselves. 2 So I
suppose they do. But that was his statement. It is up to you
to determine whether he showed any remorse or whether he
has told you everything from the witness stand that he knew.
"He was the only one there at the scene that survived and
the only one that could give you the full details, if he saw
fit so to do, but he said he didn't remember much about the
rape, didn't remember much about this or about that.
"Now you may take all those things into consideration. As
,This eomment apparently refers to testimony by defendant that on
the day following the telephone eall from his probation officer he agreed
to go with his brother and sister-in-law to decorate his mother's grave,
although he did not want to go, and at that time stated that he "kind
of more or less believed that when a person was buried you forget about
them, let the dead take eare of the dead. • . . "
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I said, the penalty is entirely up to you and let the evidence
and your conscience be your guide.''
The question to be determined is whether the judge exceeded
his authority in making the foregoing comments.
Section 19 of article VI of the Constitution, as amended in
1934, provides : ''The court ... may make such comment on
the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witnes:s
as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of
the case. The court shall inform the jury in all cases that
the jurors are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact
submitted to them and of the credibility of the witnesses.''
Similar provisions are contained in statutes. (Pen. Code,
§ 1093, subd. 6, § 1127.)
[1] It seems clear from the use of the word "comment"
in section 19 of article VI that a trial judge is empowered to
do more than merely summarize the evidence and that he
may analyze the testimony critically, giving his opinions for
the guidance of the jury. 3 If there can be any doubt in this
respect, it is put to rest by resort to the history of the section
and to the decisions which have considered the scope of the
power conferred.
[2] Prior to its amendment in 1934, section 19 of article
VI provided that a judge could ''state the testimony,'' as
well as declare the law, so that the change in language would
be meaningless if viewed as permitting only such action. The
purpose of the amendment is disclosed by the ballot argument
in its favor, which stated, "This measure ... enables the trial
judge to comment to the jury on the facts of the case; to
give the jurors his analysis of the evidence and to express his
opinion on the merits of the case, but informing them at the
same time, that his views are advisory only.... '' 4
[3] By three cases which this court decided shortly after
3
The noun "comment" is defined by Webster's New International
Dictionary, 2d ed. unabridged, 1942, as follows: '' 2. A note or observa·
tion intended to explain, illustrate, or criticize the meaning of a writing .
. . . 3. Act or instance of commenting; remark or criticism. . . . ''
Further explanation is given in ·webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, 1942,
p. 695, under the general heading of ''remark,'' where it is said: ''Com·
ment stresses interpretation, as by bringing out what is not apparent
or by adding details that heip to clarify. . . . Very frequently, in modern
use, the word implies unfavorable interpretation. . . . Comment applies
to a remark, or an observation made in criticism, in interpretation, or
in elucidation of something. . . . ''
4
It should be noted in this connection that the amendment was submitted to the voters together with another proposal, which was also
adopted, namely, an amendment to section 13 of article I giving the
judge the right to comment on a criminal defendant's failure to testify.
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it was established that the intent of the voters was to
make the
a real factor in the administration of justice,
rather than a mere referee, that the constitutional amendment
removed the prior prohibition against his power to comment,
and that he is no longer confined to a colorless recital of the
evidence but may
the testimony and express his views
with respect to its credibility. (People v. De llioss, 4 Cal.2d
469
P.2d 1031] [upholding the 11arration of circumstances
tending to militate against the defendant's claim that he loved
the victim and that the shooting was accidental]; PeoJJle v.
Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714 [56 P.2d 193] [upholding, among other
remarks relating to the defendant's testimony, the commeut
that "things don't happen that way"]; People v. Gosden,
6 Cal.2d 14 [56 P.2d 211] [upholding various remarks including the judge':; opinion that the defendant's innocent purpose
in signing the victim's name to an insurance application had
"not to my mind been satisfactorily explained" and that the
defendant's explanation for purchasing stryehninc did not
''appeal to my mind as reasonably consistent with an honest
mind"].) [4] 'l'here is a statement in People v. O'Donnell,
11 Cal.2d 666, 671 [ 81 P .2d 939], that a "trial j ndge is rigorously prohibited from action or words having the effect of
conveying to the jury his personal opinion as to the truth or
falsity of any evidence." The opinion in the 0 'Donnell case
does not mention section 19 of article VI. The quoted statement, which was made without the dtation of any authority, is
in co~1flict with the constitutional language expressly authorizing a judge to comment on "the credibility of any witness,"
and it is disapproved.
[5] A judge's power to comment on the evidPnre, of
course, is not unlimited. (People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2c1 642, 658
[140 P.2d 828] ; People v. Patnbo, 9 Cal.2d 537, 543 171 P.2d
270, 113 A.L.B.. 1303]; People v. Otteu .• 5 Cal.2d 714, 722 et
seq. [56 P.2d 193]; People v. Robinson, 73 Cal.App.2d 233,
237 [166 P.2d 17]; People v. Ramos, 66 Cal.App.2d 731, 735
[152 P.2d 758]; Kahn v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 16
Cal.App.2d 42, 45-47 [ 60 P .2d 177 J.) He may not withdraw
material evidence from the jury's consideration or distort the
testimony, and his comments should be temperately and fairly
made, rather than being argumentative or contentious to a
degree amounting to partisan advocacy. The jury, as required
by the constilutional provision, must remain as the exclusive
arbiter of qucstioM of fact and the credibility of witnesses,
50 C.2d-19
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and the
should make clear that his views are not binding
but advisory only.
The extent to which a
is free to comment on the
evidenec is e;hown by the fact that it has fn'(]_HPntly been
recognized that a judge may express his opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant, so long as the provinee of the
jury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded.
(People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 371, 383 [260 P .2d 1] ; People v.
Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876. 893 [256 P.2d 911]; People v. Dail,
22 Cal.2d 642, 658-659 [ 140 P .2d 828] ; People v. Warren,
16 Cal.2d 103, 114 [104 P.2d 1024]; People v. Endy, 12 Cal.
2d 41, 47 [ 82 P.2d 359] ; People v. Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714, 729
[56 P.2d 193]; People v. Yok1lm, 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 258 [302
P.2d 406] ; People v. Huff, 134 Cal.App.2d 182, 187 [285
P.2d 17] ; Pomerantz v. Bryan Motors, Inc., 92 Cal.App.2d
114, 119 [206 P.2d 440]; People v. Busby, 40 Cal.App.2d 193,
202 [104 P.2d 531].) 5
[6a] It is also settled that a judge ma.v rrstrict his comments to portions of the evidence or to the credibility of a
single witness and nt'ed not sum np all the testimony, both
favorable and unfavorable. (People v. Gosclcn, 6 Cal.2d 14,
27-28 [56 P.2d 211]; People v. Ottcy, 5 Cal.2d 714, 728 [56
P.2d 193]; People v. DeMoss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 476-477 [50 P.2d
1031]; People v. W cllman, 141 Cal.App.2d 101, 106 [296 P.2d
82] ; People v. Garcia, 124 Cal.App.2d 822, 830 [269 P.2d
673]; People v. Robinson, 73 Cal.App.2d 233, 238 [166 P.2d
17]; People v. Keys, 62 Cal.App.2d 903, 914 l145 P.2d 589];
People v. King, 30 Cal.App.2d 185, 205 [85 P.2d 928]; see
People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 657-658 [140 P.2d 828] ; People
v. Ernst, 121 Cal.App.2d 287, 295 [263 P.2d 114] ; Kahn v.
Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 42, 47 [60
P.2d 177].) Any statE'ments to the contrary in Pe.ople v.
Hooper, 92 Cal.App.2d 524, 531 [207 P.2d 117], People v.
Mason, 72 Cal.App.2d 699, 711 [165 P.2d 481], and People v.
Talkington, 8 Cal.App.2d 75, 99 [47 P.2d 368], are disapproved.
5
The cited decisions do not always use the same language to describe
the limitation on a judge's power to express his opinion regarding guilt
or innocence. For example, instead of saying, ''so long as the province
of the .iury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded,'' some
courts have used the qualifieation ''in proper eases,'' but it seems clear
that nothing substantially different is meant. People ''· Ottey, 5 Cal.2d
714, 729 [GG P.2d 193], which is the leading case on the point, employed
the phrase, ''so long as the province of the jury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded,'' and it has usually been cited as
authority in the subsequent decisions, including those which use different
aualifvins;r lans;rua~re.
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Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Doelc Co., 36 Cal.2d 812 [228
P.2d 557], did not involve the power to comment on the evidence but the making and granting, in the presence of the
jury, of a motion to amend the complaint so as to increase the
prayer for damages. None of the language there used was
intended to limit the commenting power, as the opinion made
clear by pointing out that there was no contention that section
19 of article VI was applicable. (36 Cal.2d at p. 823.)
[7] There is no justification for holding that a judge has a
lesser right to comment on the evidence where punishment is
involved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue,
and the same principles should be applied in determining
whether the power has been properly exercised. Section 19
of article VI n'fers to "the evidence" generally, without setting forth any distinction or qualification as to the issue upon
which the evidence bears. The evidence
of course, important in fixing the punishment, and on the prior appeal in this
case it was pointed out that ''the trend is toward the more
liberal admission of evidence pertin<:>nt only to the selection
of penalty." (People v. Friend, 47 CaJ.2d 749, 764 [306
P.2d 463].) Obviously, the judge's analysis of evidence relating to punishment may be as necessary to assist the jury as
his remarks on testimony touching upon guilt, so that the
power to comment promotes the purpose of the constitutional
amendment as much in one situation as in the other. It is true
that the jury has exclusive discretion as to the punishment
to be imposed, but no distinction can be made on this ground
since the jury is also the exclusive judge of all questions of
fact relating to guilt. In short, regardless of which issue is
being tried, the respective functions of judge and jury as to
factual questions arc the same, and neither the language of
the constitutional amendmt>nt nor the purpose underlying its
adoption permits the imposition of different limitations on
the power to comment on the evidence.
[8] In the present case the judge fully complied with the
requirement that the jury be informed that his comments were
not binding upon them. As we have seen, he pointed out at the
beginning of his comment that the jurors were free to rejec.t
anything which did not coincide with their views, that they
were the "judges of the evidence," and that it was up to them
to decide what was to be done with defendant. At the conelusion of his remarks the judge said, '' 'l'he penalty is entirely
up to you and let the evidence and your conscience be your
guide.''
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Moreover, in the course of the formal instructions which
were subsequently given upon the law, the jurors were told:
"In
the penalty, you are entirely free to act according
to your own judgment. Your discretion in the selection of
penalty is in no way circumscribrd or limited by law. It is
an absolute discretion. For examplr, there is no rule of law
which calls for a sentence of death simply because you find
that there are no mitigating or extenuating circumstances.
Similarly, there is no rule of law, which calls for a sentence
of life imprisonment simply because you find that there are
no aggravating circumstances.'' The jury was also instructed
that the choice must be a meaningful one, fundamentally based
on the evidence, but that weight could be given to ''any consideration whatever" which in the light of the evidence seemed
important to the jury, and the judge, stressing that he was
uot attempting to indicate all of the matters which might be
taken into account, listed examples of what might be considered, including many of the factors mentioned in People v.
Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 768 [306 P.2d 463]. These instructions
sufficiently set forth the principles declared on the earlier appeal, and no claim is made that any of them was incorrect.
[9] It is urged that the judge misstated the evidence in
the comment to the effect that defendant had on two occasions
refused to answer questions ''relative to the rape and relative
to the molesting of the minor children several years later and
the rape on the elderly woman" and that defendant was
ordered to answer by the court and said, "I don't remember"
or ''I don't know.'' The record discloses that the two questions which the court directed defendant to answer did not
relate to rape or to molestation of children. The first of the
two questions pertained to the location of two of defendant's
suitcases at about the time of the telephone conversation with
his probation officer, aud, after being directed to answer by
the court, defendant stated that he did not recall. The second
question, which referred to the night of the murder, was, "Did
you go down to the La Jolla Park~'' and, upon the court's
direction, defendant replied, ''I think I did.'' The record
also shows, however, that, in response to a number of questions relating to the details of his sexual misconduct, de~
fendant answered that he did not remember. The comment
of the judge, therefore, was correct with respect to the general
types of questions as to which defendant testified he could not
remember. It was inaccurate as to which questions defendant at first refused to answer and was then directed to
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answer, but this constitutes no more than a minor inaceuracy
which could not have prejudiced defendant.
[10] 'I'henc was no error in the comJHent, ''It is up to you
to determine whether he sho1ved any remorse or whether he
has told you everything from the witness stand that he knew."
It was preceded by the direetion that the
''may cont;ider" whether dcfC'nc1ant had any remorse and was followed
by the remark that "J'OU may take all those things into consideration.'' These are correct statements of the
in aecord
with the principles discussed in People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d
74!J [306 P.2d 463]. 'rhe jury was thus informed that tlH•se
matters could properly be considered; it was not told that a
determination of them, one way or the other, ·was required in
order to seleet the penalty; and, as stated above, the court
subsequently instrueted that a finding of either mitigating or
aggravating circumstances was not necessary in choosing between death or life imprisonment as the punishment.
[11] It is not trur•, as asserted by defendant, that the
comments were limited to evidence which >vas unfavorable to
him. The judge pointed out that defendant had made a confession, that he had undergone the orchidectomy, that the
jury could consider his history after the operation, and that
it did not appear that he had been in any serious trouble since
then. It may also be noted that the judge did not comment on
some evidence whieh was very unfavorable to defendant. For
example, no rel'erence was made to the testimony of defendant's sister-in-law or to the extremely damaging inferenee
permitted by it. [6b] Moreover, even if the commeuts as a
whole are regarded as placing the greater stress on matters
adverse to defendant, it is settled, as we have seen, that a
judge need not sum up all the evidence, both favorable and
unfavorable.
The juflge at no time expressed an opinion as to the penalty
whieh should he impo,;ed, and none of his stat0ments could
be reasonably regardrd as contentious to a. degree amounting
to partisan advocacy. He not only mentioned fa.rtors favorable to defendant and pointed out that the jury could consider
them but, in addition, expressed his views with respect to
adverse considerations in temperate language. Final1y, it
should again h2 rmphasized that he made clear that the comments were advisory only and that the question of penalty
was entirely within the absolute disrretion of the jury.
Under the circumstances, to hold that the judge's comments
warrant a reversal would require a determination that a
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judge has a lesser right to comment on evidence relating to
punishment than on evidence affecting guilt, and, as previously
discussed, no such distinction can be made without ignoring
the authorization contained in section 19 of article VI of the
Constitution. With the exception of the minor inaccuracy
noted above, which could not have been harmful, the comments
of the judge were in keeping with the Constitution and the
established limitations on his power, and there is no sound
basis for concluding that the question of penalty was not
fairly tried.
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is my view that the trial
judge's comments to the jury in the case at bar go far afield
from the court's proper function, exceed the court's power to
''make such comment on the evidence and the testimonv and
credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessa;y for
the proper determination of the case" (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 19) as that power relates to the selection of penalty for first
degree murcler, and invade a province which by law is solely
that of the jury.
The most serious departure by the trial judge (and by the
majority) from the law as spelled out in our previous decisions (see People v. Friend (1957), 47 Cal.2d 749, 766 [13]
[306 P.2d 463]; People v. Green (1956), 47 Cal.2d 209, 218232 [7-10] [302 P.2d 307]; see also People v. Hall (1926), 199
Cal. 451, 456-458 [249 P. 859]; People v. Bollinger (1925),
196 Cal. 191, 207 [237 P. 25]; People v. Le.ary (1895), 105
Cal. 486, 496 [39 P. 24]) is that here the trial judge made
unmistakably clear to the jury the fact that in his opinion they
should fix the punishment at death. The majority purport to
meet this issue by holding that ''The extent to which a judge
is free to comment on the evidence is shown by the fact that
it has frequently been recognized that a judge may express
his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant ...
There is no justification for holding that a judge has a lesser
right to comment on the evidence where punishment is involved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue, and
the same principles should be applied in determining whether
the power has been properly exercised.'' Contrary to the
majority's quoted declaration, there is justification-indeed,
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not only justification but necessity, if we are to abide by the
law previously enunciated-for holding that ''a judge has a
lesser right to comment on the evidence where punishment is
involved than where matters relating to guilt are in issue."
The difference is an obvious one. Guilt must always depend
on evidence and only on
and the judge may comment
on evidence hence, he may indicate an opinion as to the fact
which depends on evidence. But where punishment (in a
first degree murder case) is involved the selection of the
penalty need not depend in any degree whatsoever on the
evidence and, under the legislative plan as we have construed
it, must always include exercise of an "absolute" or unfettered discretion.
As we unqualifiedly enunciated in People v. Friend (1957),
supra, 47 CaL2d 749, 764-765 [11], the discretion of the jury
as to pcualty in a first degree murder case is absolute 1 and
may be resolved on considerations of pure con,jecture, sympathy, apprehension, etc.; it is the law (pp. 767-768 of 47
CaL2d) "that insofar as selecting the penalty is concerned
(as between the two alternatives [of life imprisonment or
death)) the law does not itself prescribe, nor authorize the
court to innovate, any rule circumscribing the exercise of
1
This holding was by no means new to the law. In People v. Green
(1956), supra, 47 Cal.2d 209, 218 [5], we declared: "There has never
been any suggestion or intimation within the language of the statute
since its 1874 amendment [sectwn 1!10 of the Penal Code as amended in
1874 provided that "Every person guilty of murder in the first degree
shall suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same . . . ''] that the discretion of the jury
was conditional on, or had to be guided by, any particular circumstances
. . . " (See also id., pp. 218-219 L7J of 47 Cal.2d.) And in People v.
Bollinger ( 1925), s11pra, 196 CaL 191, 207, on the authority of People v.
Leary (1895), supra, 103 Cal. 486, we held; "It is clear beyond question
that by the language of the amended seetion fPen. Code, ~ 190, as
amended by Stats. 1873-1874, p. 457] . . . two changes were made in the
law as to the punishment for murder in the first degree-first, that the
punishment may be either d<'ath or life imprisonment; and, second, that
the discretion of determining which punishment shall be imposed was
vested in the jury alone. For . . . the law places no restriction upon the
jury's exercise of such discretion, nor does it attempt to confine its
exercise to cases presenting palliating or mitigating circumstances. . . .
The legislatnre has 'confided the power to affix the punishment within
these two alternatives to the absolute discretion of the jury . . . . ' (People
v. Leary [189::;, supra], 103 CaL 4ilo, 496 [39 P. 24].)" And as we stated
in the Green case (pp. 22:1-23G of 47 Cal.2d), "The above quotation from
the Hall case (199 Cal. 4:)1, 4:iG-4.38) [the quotation from the Hall case
appears at pp. 224-23:) of tho Green rase], together with that portion of
the Bollinger cnse (196 CaL 191, 207) which quotes section 190 of the
Penni Code (as amcnc1ed in 1873-1874) with the declaration that its meaning is 'clear beyond question,' correctly states the law; the decision
we make today at last requires compliance with that law.''
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their discretion, but, rather, commits the <whole matter of its
exercise to the judgment and the consciences of the jury; that
in deciding the question <whether the accused should be put to
death or sentenced to imprisonment for life it is within their
discretion alone to determine, each for himself, how far he will
accord
to the considerations of the several objectives
of punishment, of the deterrence of crime, of the protection of
society, of the desirability of stern retribution, or of sympathy
or clemency, of age, sex, human passion,
or weakness, or (if appropriate under the evidence, of illness or
intoxication or provocation not sufficient to reduce the degree
or class of the crime), of the presumptions concerning, or
possible uncertainties attaching to, life imprisonment, or of
the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of death, or an
apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have not
been brought to light, or any other consideration whatever
which in the light of the evidence, the duty they owe to the
accused and to the state, and the law as explained to them
by the judge, appears to them to be important.''
Although the trial judge gave lip service to the rule that
"the penalty is entirely up to you [the jury]," and "anything I say is not binding on you," his comments as a whole,
even if they were an accurate review of such of the evidence
as he commented upon, would constitute a partisan plea for
the more extreme penalty. The judge not only indicated in
a general way his view that the penalty should be death; he
went on to particularize his reasons for his view. He made it
clear that in his opinion defendant showed no remorse ("I
seemed to feel as I heard it that Mr. Friend was concerned
mostly about his own plight and not what he had done")
and that defendant had not fully disclosed details of the
crime known to him ("He was the only one . . . that could
give you the full details, if he saw fit so to do, but he said
he didn't remember much about the rape, didn't remember
much about this or about that"). Furthermore, in giving
his reasons, the trial judge did not merely comment on the
evidence; he misstated evidence unfavorably to defendant.
The judge said, ''Yon saw the defendant on the witness stand
on two different occasions when he wouldn't answer the questions on cross-examination . . . . \Vhcn certain questions were
asked him why he didn't want to answer them. \Vhen I
orderrd him to answer them he said, 'I don't rrmembcr,' or
'I don't know.' Those were questions relative to the rape and
relative to the molesting of the minor children several years
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later and the rape on the elderly woman on which he was on
probation at the time he was picked up for this offense."
The two questions ·which defendant did not answer tlirectly,
and ·which the judge directed him to answt'r, bad nothing to
do with rape or molestation of children. One of the inc-id<:>nts
which resulted in the judge's
defendant to answer
on cross-examination was as follows:
'' Q. Did you have a couple of suitcas<:'s there [at defendant's
brother's house ·when defendant called the newspaper reporter] ? A. Yes.
"Q. \\There were they in the house? A. I can't say where.
That makes no difference. They were in the house.
''THE CouRT: Answer the question.
''A. \Vell, I don't recall now just exactly where they were
in the house.''
The second incident whieh resulted in the judge's direeting
defendant to answer on cross-examination was as follows:
"Q. Did you go down to the La Jolla Park [on the night
defendant killed Miss Muir] 1 A. I think at this time, I think
the story has been told so clog-gonned many times I am getting
tir<?d of repeating the thing.
''THE CouRT: Mr. Friend, you will answer the questions.
You have given your story on direet and you will give it on
crOSfl. Now you answer the questions.
'' Bv MR. I1ow: Q. Did you go down to the La Jolla Parl• 2
A. I think I did."
Manifestly these two ineidents did not involve matters as
serious as those indieated in the trial judge's eomments; they
did not concern defendant's offenses of rape and molestation
of minor ehildren. The judge's statement that defendant refused to answer questions about those important and damaging matters was seriously prejudieial to defendant.
On the prior appeal in this case (People v. Friend (1957),
supra, 47 Cal.2d 749) we took cognizance of the sole and
absolute disc'retion of the jury in the seleetion between the
two alternative but equally prescrilwd punishments, and for
the guidance and assi:-:tancc of trial judges speeifiea 1ly pointed
out that (p. 766 of 47 Cal.2d) "[13] Quite naturally jurors,
in the conscientious dischargr of their dnty, are eager, as were
those in this ease, to have all the guidanee the law ean give
them. This poses a delicate task for the trial judge but his
duty is elear. He must, of course, inform the jurors that they
have no coneern with punishment unless, under the instructions applicable to the trial of the issue of guilty or not guilty,
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shall have found that
all reasonable doubt the
defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree as charged.r 2 l
When and if they so find, the duty of selecting the penalty
devolves upon them, and on them alone, and they should be
instructed as to the absolute nature of their power in the
exercise of that function.
"From the discussion of the subject hereinabove and in
v. Green (1956),
47 Cai.2d] 209, 217-221, 229232, it appears that there need· be no error in counsel's
advancing arguments as to which penalty will better serve
the objectives of punishment, or in contending that the effect
of certain evidence is 'mitigating' or 'aggravating,' as may
affect their selection of the punishment to be imposed, provided
that the jurors in every case are clearly and adequately instr1teted as to the fttll scope of their function. They should
be told (in accord with the law as reviewed in People v. Green
( 1956), supra, and herein) that beyond prescribing the two
alternative penalties the law itself provides no standard for
their guidance in the selection of the punishment; that the law
provides equally the two penalties of death or life imprisonment, but that neither penalty attaches automatically or at
all until the jury unanimously agree upon their choice of
punishment and designate it in their verdict; that the choice
as between the two penalties is in every case committed to their
absolute discretion." (Italics added.)
Section 190 of the Penal Code ''clearly and equally states
two alternatives as punishment; it gives preference to
neither." (People v. Green ( 1956), Sttpra, 47 Cal.2d 209,
218 [7]; People v. Friend (1957), supra, 47 CaL2d 749, 751
[5a]; People v. Brust (1957), 47 Cal.2d 776, 787 [9] [306
P.2d 480].) Since the law itself suggests no preference for
penalty or basis for making the selection, neither should the
trial judge, by comment to the jury, suggest preference for
either penalty or emphasize factors which would tend to influence the jury toward either penalty. Selection of penalty,
as we have repeatedly emphasized, is exclusively and absolutely the province of the jury. Presumptively, a suggestion
that the death penalty should not be imposed would not be
prejudicial to the defendant, but certainly any suggestion that
it should be imposed would be inherently prejudicial.
As to comment on the evidence relating to the issue of guilt
•since the 1957 enactment of section 190.1 of the Penal Code, the
issue of punishment is separately tried if a person is found guilty of
an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death.
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or innocence it is
said in People v. Robinson (1946),
73 Cal.App.2d
237 [166 P.2d 17], that "The right thus
conferred to comment on the eYidence is a most potent one.
to eommE'nt,
if thE'y do so,
E'areful to exE'reise the power with
wisdom and restraint. The point need not be labored that
the members of the
are apt to
great
to any
hint from the
as to his opinion on the weight of the
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, and, for that
reason, care slJOu1d be taken not to affect unfairly the rights
of the defendant." And comment on the evidence relating
to the selection of penalty
as hereinabove indicated, a far
more delicate matter t11an comment on the facts bearing on
the issue of guilt or innocence. On the issue of penalty,
where so many factors, including extra}udicial factors, may
properly influence-indeed, alone control-the jury's verdict,
comment should be strictly restrained to the scope, nature, and
substance we so carefully enunciated in the Green, Brust, and
earlier Friend decisions; it should never extend to or encompass any indication by the judge that in his opinion the death
penalty should be selected. Such an indication is inherently
an invasion of the :field which by law is committed exclusively
and absolutely to the jury, and is clearly prejudicial to the
defendant. Comment which passes the limit of fairness and
amounts to advocacy of the more severe penalty is indisputably in contravention of our studird holdings in the Green,
Brust, and previous Friend cases as well as of the long
established rulings of this court in surh cases as People v.
Leary (1895), supra, 105 Cal. 486, 493, and People v. Bollinger (1925), supra, 196 Cal. 191, 207. If we are so soon
to depart from such certainty and clarity as the Green, Brust,
and Friend holdings provided and arc to again indulge at least
in part the inconsistencies which had plagued us for so many
years (from 1874 to 1956; see People v. Green (1956), supra,
47 Cal.2d 209, 218-232) we owe it to the bench and bar to
specify those holdings which today are intended to be overruled.
Simple intellectual integrity requires us to recall now the
miserable mass and mess of irreconcilable inconsistencies which
had been growing from (on the one side) the gross errors of
People v. Welch (1874), 49 Cal. 174, clear down through
J{olez (1944), 23 Ca1.2d 670 [145 P.2d 580], Williams (J948),
32 Ca1.2d 78 [195 P.2d 393], and Byrcl (1954), 42 Cal.2d 200
[266 P.2d 505], and (on the other side) the never heretofore
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disputed correctness of the 'It is clear beyond question"
holdings of Leary (1895), 105 Cal. 486, 496 [39 P. 24],
Bollinger (1925), 196 Cal. 191, 207 [237 P. 25], and Hall
(1926), 199 Cal. 451, 456-458 [249 P. 859], and many other
cases down to Green wherein
p. 226 of 47 Cal.2d) we
accepted the law which for so many years had been "clt>ar
beyond question'' and declared that ''the decision we make
today at last requires compliance with that law." But this
is another "today," some two years later than Green. And
on this "today" the majority implicitly and essentially recant
the brave declaration of two years ago. As of today the law
that from 1895 to 1956 was "clear beyond question" is either
no longer the law or it is no longer clear. Furthermore,
the decision today tells the bench and the bar that we no
longer require "compliance with that law"; no longer is the
discretion of the jury in the s<'lection of penalty absolute or
unfettered; no longer is the selection of penalty exclusively
the province of the jury. Rather, the majority today hold,
even though the selection of penalty (as between the two
equally prescribed), unlike the issue of guilt, is not a matter
which must be resolved on or controlled by the evidence, that
nevertheless the judge may not only comment on the evidence
but may intimate that it does not warrant selection of life
imprisonment in preference to death; and even though it is
(or was) altogether clear that the jury alone has the function
of selecting the penalty, the judge may tell them that in his
opinion they should fix the penalty at death.
The above indicated changes in the law which are express or
implicit in today's majority decision impel me to reiterate
some of the principles which, although apparently no longer
the law, are, I think, deserving of respect.
A jury of laymen confronted with the difficult task of
selecting between the penalty of death and that of life imprisonment will, it may be assumed, look to the trial judge for
such guidance as he may give them, and will be likely to take
their cue from any intimation of the trial judge as to what
verdict he believes they should return. Instead of attempting to influence the jurors to accept his view the trial judge
should inform them in accord with the law stated in People
v. Friend (1957), supra, 47 Cal.2d 749, 767, "that beyond
prescribing the two alternative penalties the law itself provides
no standard for their guidance in the selection of the punishment; that the law provides equally the two penalties of
death or life imprisonment, but that neither penalty attaches
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automatically or at all until the jury unanimously agree upon
their choice of punishment and designate it in their verdict;
that the choice as between the two penalties is in every case
eommitted to their absolute discretion," etc. It would be a
rare case, if any, in which it would be proper for a trial judge
to make any other comment on the law or the facts pertaining
to the selection of penalty than comment of the scope and substance of that set forth in the Friend ease, supra, pagrs 766pages 509. 51:3.
768 of 47 Cal.2d, and quoted in large part
It is improper for the trial judge to throw the weight of
his office behind a selection which is for the jury alone. "It
is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence
of the trial judge on the jury is neeessarily and properly oE
great weight, and that his lightest word or intimation is reeeived with deference, and may prove controlling." (Starr
v. United States (1894), 153 U.S. 614, 626 [14 S.Ct. 919, 38
L.Ed. 841], quoted in Bollenbach v. United States (1946),
326 U.S. 607, 612 [66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 3501, and in
Sanm~inetti v. JJloorc Dry Dock Co. ( 19;)1), 36 Cal.2d 812. 819
[228 P .2d 557].) In the Sanguinetti case', an action for damages under the Jones Aet, plaintiff's counsel in the presence
of the jury asked leave to amend the comp1aint to increase
the amount of damages prayed for from $50,000 to $75.000.
The trial court, outside the prrsence of the jnry, granted the
motion and denied defendant's motion for mistrial on the
ground of misconduct of plaintiff's counsel in presenting the
motion in the jury's presence. 'fhe court instructed the jury
that "The damages must be reasonable and cannot be in t'Xcess of the amount alleged in the complaint, namt'1y $75.000."
We held (p. 819 [3] of 36 CaL2d) that " . . . any practice
whieh would inelude the making of a motion, in the presence
of the jury, after production of evidenet', to inc-rease the
amount of damagcs askcd, and which would bring to the
knowledge of the jury the fact that the conrt after hearing
plaintiff's evidence permitted the eomplaint to be amended
by inereasing the prayer for damagcs, shonld he nnht'sitantly
eondemned and strieken down." for (p. 819 [ 4] of 3G Ca1.2({)
"It is, of course, elementary tlmt the amount of dama~0s is
ordinarily a question of fact to be determined hv the jnry."
It is true that the Sanguinrtti case was bv a bare majority
of this court but I do not understanr1 thnt the drrlarcd
principles of law, as such. were srrions1y disnutecl. It was,
rather, applieation of those princinles to the faets of the rase
on which ~we divided. In the speeifie criminal case now before
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us, it seems to me that the court's
as to
selection
a matter committed to the sole and absolute discretion of the
, much more than its influencing
the jury in any civil case as to amount of
should be
unhesitantly condemned and strickrn down.
statements in Dorsey v.
Also analogous are the
Barba
, 38 Cal.2d 350
P .2d 604], which holds that
the trial court docs not have the power to increase an inadequate award of unliquidated damages without plaintiffs'
consent: (p. 356
of 38 Cal.2d) "An essential element
[of the constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury]
. . . is that issues of fact shall be decided by a jury, and the
assessment of damages is ordinarily a question of fact. The
jury as a fact-finding body occupies so firm and important
a place in our system of jurisprudence that any interference
with its function in this respect must be examined with the
utmost care"; (p. 358 [10] of 38 Cal.2d) "it is not the
mere form of a jury trial to which one is entitled under the
Constitution, but the fundamental right to have a jury determination of fact." IJikewise it is not the mere form of a
jury selection of penalty to which a defendant is entitled
under the Penal Code, but the fundamental right to have the
selection made by the jury uninfluenced by the trial court.
It seems particularly incongruous, in my sense of relative
values, that this court should reach the result of the majority
in this case when so recently the court in considering a claim
for damages in a civil case held that there must be a new trial
because a jury may have been "misled [by statements of the
trial judge] as to the proper manner of determining liability."
In Butir;an v. Yellow Cab Co. (1958), 49 Cal.2d 652, 660 [320
P.2d 500], this court (even though the Vchicle Code expressly
recognizes unavoidable accident as a defense in the circumstances there defined, and even though the instruction had
been recognized as proper for many years) held that through
the giving of the instruction on unavoidable accident the
jurors "may get the impr0ssion that unavoidability is an issue
to be decided and that, if proved, it constitutes a separate
ground of nonliability of the d0fendant. Thus they may be
misled as to the proper manner of d0termining liability . . . "
How much more likely it is that the jury in this penaltyand inherently damaging stat0m0nts of the trial judge.
selection case were misled by the inaccurate, unwarranted,
The fact that the defendant in thE' instant case is a miserable,
friendless creature, guilty of horrible crimes, does not make
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in what I
the proper
of our function,
any less
of: a fair trial than was the plaintiff in
v. Yellow Cab
supra.
The cases last eitrod and summarized
to situations
other than
now before us the familiar concept that
tl1e trial
should
.interfere in matters
whieh are for the cxelnsiv0 determination of th0
The
Green (1956), supra, 47 Cal.2d
and earlier Friend (,January
, supra, 47 Cal.2d
casrc;
apply
that eoneept to the
selection of penalty. Since
the latter deeisions
since the return, on ,June
1957, of
the
influenced verdict now under consideration),
the ru1e:s there announeed have received implic~it lc•gislative approval
an enactment whieh went into effrct on September
11, 1957, and which amended section 190 of the Prnal Code
and adopted section lf/0.1 of that code so as to provide for a
separate trial on the issue of pnnislmwnt in the case of a
person c:harp:ed with an offense fer which the pena1ty is in the
alternative death or life imprisonment,
Section 190.1 provir1rs in part that "Evid0nce may be presented at the further proc-eedings on tl1e issne of penalty, of
the circumstanc-es :surronw1ing the crime, of the defendant's
background and history, and of: an~r facts in af('gravation or
mitigation of the penalty." 'l'hns the seetion elearlv aecepts
our suggrstion in the rarlier Priend opinion (p. 763 of 47
Ca1.2d, footnote 7) that "The el1aractrr and seopc> of evidence
pertinent to punishment which slwnld be reeeivcd in a case
wherein tllC' jury is reqnirrc1 to fix the penalty, is a subject
which could wrll recrivr leg-islativr attention."
Section 190.1 fnrthrr proYidrs in material rart that "In
any case in whieh c1efrndant l111s hrrn fonnr1 gnili~, by a jnry,
and the same or anothrr jury, trying: the issne of penalt:l', is
unable to reach a nnanimons verciirt on the issne of prnalty,
the conrt shall dismiss the jnry and c•ilhrr impose thr punishment for lifr in lien of ordering a new trial on the issne of
penalty, or order a nrw
impanrled to tnr the issue of
penalty . . . " The \Yorc!ing of this nrw sedinn rrrtainly
does not pnrport to anthorize thr trial .imlcrr to "order a new
jnry imnanrlrd to trY tlw issne of nrnaltv" and to {ngfnrct
them tlwt in J;is
shou/<1
thr
at death.
It dor.s authorize tlw trial jn(11.(l' to "eitlH•r imT'osr the rmnishmrnt for 1ifr . , . or order a nrw
impaneled to try the
issue of peualty."
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There is not the
indication in the new section
that the Legislature intended to alter the rules spelled out by
this court in Pcopl e v. Green ( 1956), supra, 47 Cal.2d 209,
and People v. F1·iencl (1957), supra, 47 Ca1.2d 749. The section does not empower the
to instruct the jury in any
way whatsoever not consonant with those rules. Rather, by
dealing with the matters there determined in a manner consistent with those determinations it in effect rerognizes and
approves our holdings. Today the majority not only refuse to
recognize and apply those holdings;
further refuse to
accept the legislative reco<.;nition of such holdings.
For the rC'asons above statC'cl I would reverse the judgment
and the order denying a new trial.
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I am in full accord with the vic'lvs expressed by Mr. ,Tustice
Schauer in his dissenting opinion in this case. The quoted
statements of the trial jndge to the jury were obviously intended to and did influence the jury in the rendition of its
verdict. The unmistakable effect of these statrments was to
deny defendant the free, untrammeled and unbiased determination of the jury as to punishnwnt to which defenc1ant was
entitled under the law of this state. As forcibly pointed out
in said dissenting opillion, the majority of tbis court has reversed judgments based upon jury verdicts in civil cases where
the alleged error was infinitesimal compared to that shown
by the record in this case. 'l'his is particularly true where
the a11rged error consisted of commrnts or statements of the
trial judge which may have affected the determination reached
hy the jury.
In Sanquinctti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 36 Ca1.2d 812 [228
P.2d 557], I could see no error, mnch less prejudicial miscondnrt, on the part of either the trial judge or counsel for
plaintiff which in any manner influenced the verdict in that
ease (see my dissent, p. 828 et SE'q.), but a majority of this
eourt nevC'rthrless reversed a judgm0nt for plaintiff which was
ohvionsly surmorted by substantial evidence bC'canse plaintiff's
C'onns0l. in the presence of the jury, moved to amend the
prfl~·er of plaintiff's complflint hy increasing the demand for
damflgPs from $50,000 to $75,000. The court did not rule on
tl1is motion in the presence of the jury, but later granted
it and instructed the jury that it could not return a verdict in
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excess of tlle sum of
the amount demamlrd
'rhc
returned a verdict
and a
ma;jority of this court rcv<ersed a
enterrd thereon on
tJw sole ground that the
constitnted
I did not agree
misconduet
that its adverse effect npon the
c:nmoi
To my mind it is
tmfortnnate
in a criminal ease is upheld in the faee of ohvions and
misconduct on the 11art of a trial
or prosecuting attorney ·with the
's approval, as sneh a situation
casts gran doubt upon the fairness of the trial anrl may
amount to a violation of the due process elnnses of both the
state and federal Constitutions. Snch ·was the sitnation in
the recent case of People v.
p. T5
P.2d
397]
dissenting opinion,
p. 106), where the same
trial judge presided as in the case at bar.
It is my considered opinion that the administration of
tive is defeated in many cases wl1ere a trial jni!ge throws the
weight of his position against a litigant by eoll(lnet or statements designed to influence the jury agaimt sur·h litigant.
'\Vhilc jurors do not always respond to snch conrlnr·t, there
is a temlency for thrm to flo so, ·whir·h has tllr rffrrt of depriving the litigant of his right to a fair trial before a jury.
Unless this eonrt assumes thr~ hnnlrn of eorrceting- sitnatiom;
of this character when called to its attention, we might just
as well abolish our jury s~rstem.
I would reverse the jndg-mrnt impo"ing the (Jroaih penalty
and grant defendant a new trial on the issue of punishment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing- >nls d0nied .Jnlv 30,
1958. Carter, .J., St'haurr, ,T., and l\feComh, ,J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

